Protection For Sale Or Surge Protection?

Hajime Katayama, Susumu Imai and Kala Krishna ()

No 1114, Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: This paper asks whether the results obtained from using the standard approach to testing the influential Grossman and Helpman "protection for sale (PFS)" model of political economy might arise from a simpler setting. A model of imports and quotas with protection occuring in response to import surges, but only for organized industries, is simulated and shown to provide parameter estimates consistent with the protection for sale framework. This suggests that the standard approach may be less of a test than previously thought.

Keywords: Common agency; Political economy; Protection for sale; Quotas; Non tariff barriers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 F13 F17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
Date: 2006-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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https://www.econ.queensu.ca/sites/econ.queensu.ca/files/qed_wp_1114.pdf First version 2006 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Protection for sale or surge protection? (2009)
Working Paper: Protection for Sale or Surge Protection? (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:1114

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