An Alternative Explanation Of The Chance Of Casting A Pivotal Vote

Dan Usher

No 1238, Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: This paper is about a model of uncertainty in voting that allows for a schedule of people`s preferences for one party over another, that gives rise to a chance of casting a pivotal vote which is small but not, as often supposed, infinitesimal, that is not inconsistent with evidence about the chance of casting a pivotal vote and that preserves a role for self-interest, along with a duty to vote, in the decision whether to vote or abstain.

Keywords: Pivital voting; Duty to vote; compulsory voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2011-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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https://www.econ.queensu.ca/sites/econ.queensu.ca/files/wpaper/qed_wp_1238.pdf First version 2011 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: An alternative explanation of the chance of casting a pivotal vote (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:1238

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