University Funding Policies: Buildings Or Citizens?

Pier-André Bouchard St-Amant ()

No 1302, Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: Governments fund public universities based on the number of registered students and lump sum transfers. Such policy induces universities to compete for student recruitment. I show that such rule can lead to an inefficient allocation of resources in which universities compete for the same students. I suggest a more efficient policy that achieves the social optimum for any given level of funding. Such funding rule should not be solely based on university's own enrolement, but also on enrolment in competing universities.

Keywords: University; Funding Rule; Funding Policies; Decentralized Decisions; Spending Efficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H52 I23 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15 pages
Date: 2013-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-edu
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:1302

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