Probabilistic Sophistication And Reverse Bayesianism
Edi Karni and
Marie-Louise Vierø
No 1303, Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University
Abstract:
This paper extends our earlier work on reverse Bayesianism by relaxing theassumption that decision makers abide by expected utility theory, assuming instead weaker axioms that merely imply that they are probabilistically sophisticated. We show that our main results, namely, (modified)representation theorems and corresponding rules for updating beliefs over expanding state spaces and null events that constitute "reverse Bayesianism," remain valid.
Keywords: Awareness; Unawareness; Reverse Bayesianism; Probabilistic sophistication (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D8 D81 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 2013-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-upt
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
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https://www.econ.queensu.ca/sites/econ.queensu.ca/files/qed_wp_1303.pdf First version 2013 (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Probabilistic sophistication and reverse Bayesianism (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:1303
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