Information Sharing And Incentives In Organizations

Jean-Etienne de Bettignies and Jan Zabojnik

No 1321, Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: We examine optimal information flows between a manager and a worker who is in charge of evaluating a parameter of interest, e.g. the value of a project. The manager may possesses information about the parameter, and, if informed, may divulge her information to the worker. We show that information sharing may weaken the worker's incentives and that, consequently, the manager may find it optimal to conceal her information from the worker. Moreover, the manager faces a time-inconsistency problem, which leads her to conceal her information more often than she would if she could commit to an information sharing policy. We build on these results to address issues related to authority in organizations.

Keywords: Information non-disclosure; expert evaluation; agency costs; authority (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D82 L23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 2013-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-hrm, nep-mic and nep-ppm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://www.econ.queensu.ca/sites/econ.queensu.ca/files/qed_wp_1321.pdf First version 2013 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Information Sharing and Incentives in Organizations (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:1321

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