Persistence Of Power: Repeated Multilateral Bargaining

Marina Agranov, Christopher Cotton and Chloe Tergiman
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Marina Agranov: California Institute of Technology
Chloe Tergiman: Penn State University

No 1374, Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: We develop a model of repeated multilateral bargaining that links cycles via the identity of the agenda setter. In sharp contrast to the standard history-independent equilibrium predictions, in an experiment, we observe stable and persistent coalitions in terms of member identity, allocations to coalition partners, and agenda-setter identity. Our results call into question the validity of restricting attention to static, history-independent strategies in dynamic bargaining games. We show that weakening the standard equilibria concepts to allow players to condition on a single piece of history is enough to generate equilibria which are consistent with observed laboratory outcomes.

Keywords: experiment; legislative bargaining; vote of confidence; legislative decision making; political institutions; dynamic bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C78 C92 D02 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 52 pages
Date: 2016-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:1374

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