Disincentive Effects of Evaluation

Raphael Boleslavsky, Bruce Carlin and Christopher Cotton
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Raphael Boleslavsky: University of Miami
Bruce Carlin: UCLA

No 1410, Working Paper from Economics Department, Queen's University

Abstract: In a model of project design, evaluation, and selection, we explore how the incentives to improve the design of projects depend on the availability of funding and the process of evaluation. We show that project designers (researchers or NGOs) prefer to subject their projects to less-rigorous evaluations than donors or funding agencies would prefer, ex-post. We also show how an increase in either funding availability or the informativeness of evaluations tends to decrease investments in project quality. By implication, increased availability of funding or more-informative evaluations can lead to the implementation of fewer high-value projects.

Keywords: Game theory; Impact evaluation; Pilot studies; Funding allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 H43 O22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19 pages
Date: 2019-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm and nep-exp
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qed:wpaper:1410

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