Imitation Games and Computation

Andrew McLennan () and Rabee Tourky
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Rabee Tourky: School of Economics, The University of Queensland, https://economics.uq.edu.au/

No 359, Discussion Papers Series from University of Queensland, School of Economics

Abstract: TAn imitation game is a finite two person normal form game in which the two players have the same set of pure strategies and the goal of the second player is to choose the same pure strategy as the first player. Gale et al. (1950) gave a way of passing from a given two person game to a symmetric game whose symmetric Nash equilibria are in oneto-one correspondence with the Nash equilibria of the given game. We give a way of passing from a given symmetric two person game to an imitation game whose Nash equilibria are in one-to-one correspondence with the symmetric Nash equilibria of the given symmetric game. Lemke (1965) portrayed the Lemke-Howson algorithm as a special case of the Lemke paths algorithm. Using imitation games, we show how Lemke paths may be obtained by projecting Lemke-Howson paths.

Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Journal Article: Imitation games and computation (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qld:uq2004:359

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