Resolving rent-seeking puzzles: A model of political influence via social signals

Cameron Murray ()

No 528, Discussion Papers Series from University of Queensland, School of Economics

Abstract: The empirical observations of underinvestment, loyalty and inequality of access to rent-seeking activities are theoretical puzzles. Drawing on the concepts of power, trust and signals, a new model of political influence via trust-signalling agents is developed. This ‘trust-signalling’ model generates a much richer set of predictions about the market for political influence, resolves the three identified puzzles, and offers a number of testable predictions.

Date: 2014-04-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol and nep-soc
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qld:uq2004:528

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