A Nash Equilibrium in Electoral Competition Models
Shino Takayama (s.takayama@economics.uq.edu.au) and
Yuki Tamura
No 546, Discussion Papers Series from University of Queensland, School of Economics
Abstract:
Since the introduction of better-reply security by Reny (1999), the literature studying the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) in discontinuous games has grown substantially. In this paper, we introduce a weak notion of better-reply security, which is applicable to both quasiconcave and nonquasiconcave games. Our conditions for feeble better-reply security are simple, easy to verify and particularly useful in electoral competition games. We also provide necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of a PSNE in a canonical electoral competition game. Finally, this paper demonstrates why a PSNE fails to exist when a particular type of discontinuity exists in a model.
Keywords: Noncooperative games; discontinuous payoffs; pure strategy Nash equilibrium; existence of equilibrium; better-reply security; electoral competitions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-05-27
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe, nep-mic and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qld:uq2004:546
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