Theories of reasoning and focal point play with a non-student sample

Zhixin Dai, Jiwei Zheng and Daniel Zizzo
Additional contact information
Zhixin Dai: China Financial Policy Research Center, School of Finance, Renmin University of China
Jiwei Zheng: School of Economics and Centre for Behavioural and Experimental Social Science, University of East Anglia

No 612, Discussion Papers Series from University of Queensland, School of Economics

Abstract: We present a coordination game experiment testing the robustness of the predictive power of level-k reasoning and team reasoning in a sample of Chinese tax administrators. We show how the incidence of coordination game play is virtually identical between Chinese tax administrators and university students, which in turn is comparable with that found in research with a Western university student sample. However, relatively to non-students, students are comparatively more attracted by the focal point under team reasoning when this has equal payoffs and the other outcomes do not.

Keywords: non-student subjects; focal points; team reasoning; level-k; coordination games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 C91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019-12-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-hpe
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://economics.uq.edu.au/files/17563/612.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:qld:uq2004:612

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Discussion Papers Series from University of Queensland, School of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by SOE IT ().