Voting to Tell Others

Gautam Rao, Stefano DellaVigna, John List and Ulrike Malmendier

Working Paper from Harvard University OpenScholar

Abstract: Why do people vote? We design a field experiment to estimate a model of voting `because others will ask'. The expectation of being asked motivates turnout if individuals derive pride from telling others that they voted, or feel shame from admitting that they did not vote, provided that lying is costly. In a door-to-door survey about election turnout, we experimentally vary (i) the informational content and use of a flyer pre-announcing the survey, (ii) the duration and payment for the survey, and (iii) the incentives to lie about past voting. The experimental results indicate significant social image concerns. For the 2010 Congressional election, we estimate a value of voting `because others will ask' of $5-$15, one of the first estimates of the value of voting in the literature.

New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-pol and nep-soc
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Related works:
Journal Article: Voting to Tell Others (2017)
Working Paper: Voting to Tell Others (2016)
Working Paper: Voting to Tell Others (2014)
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