The redesign of the medical intern assignment mechanism in Israel

Alvin Roth and Ran Shorrer

Working Paper from Harvard University OpenScholar

Abstract: A collaboration of medical professionals with economists and computer scientists involved in ?market design? had led to the redesign of the clearinghouse assigning medical students to internships in Israel. The new mechanism presents significant efficiency gains relative to the previous one, and almost all students get a better chance of getting what they want. Continued monitoring of the new mechanism is required to verify that it is not abused, and explore whether it can be improved. Other organizations in Israel may also be able to profit from the experience that accumulates from market design, both in Israel and abroad.

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