Incentive Effects in Tournaments with Heterogeneous Competitors – an Analysis of the Olympic Rowing Regatta in Sydney 2000

Norbert Bach (), Oliver Guertler () and Joachim Prinz ()
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Norbert Bach: Department of Management and Organization, Ilmenau University of Technology, Helmholtzplatz 3, D – 98684, Ilmenau, Germany
Oliver Guertler: Department of Economics, BWL II, University of Bonn, Adenauerallee 24-42, D – 53113 Bonn, Germany
Joachim Prinz: Department of Management, University of Paderborn, Warburgerstr. 100, D – 33098 Paderborn, Germany
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Oliver Gürtler

management revue. Socio-economic Studies, 2009, vol. 20, issue 3, 239-253

Abstract: A large part of the theoretical tournament literature argues that rank-order tournaments only unfold their incentive effects if the contestants all have similar prospects of winning. In heterogeneous fields, the outcome of the tournament is relatively clear and the contestants reduce their effort. However, empirical evidence for this so-called contamination hypothesis is sparse. An analysis of 442 showings at the Olympic Rowing Regatta in Sydney 2000 gives evidence that oarsmen spare effort in heterogeneous heats. This implies that competition among staffs with heterogeneous skill levels does not bring about the intended effort levels. However, a separate subgroup analysis shows that only the tournament favourites hold back effort whereas underdogs bring out their best when competing against dominant rivals. A heterogeneous tournament could then be enriched by absolute performance standards to increase incentives of the favourites.

Keywords: tournaments; heterogeneity; incentive effects; effort (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A10 A12 J20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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