Reverting to Informality Unregistered Property Transactions and the Erosion of the Titling Reform in Peru

Italo Gutierrez and Oswaldo Molina

No WR-1156-1, Working Papers from RAND Corporation

Abstract: Titling programs have focused mostly on providing initial tenure security and have not properly addressed maintaining the formality of future property transactions. Our data indicates that properties become de-regularized due to unregistered transactions in urban slums, which threatens to undo the success of the titling program in the long run. We exploit a natural experiment provided by the elimination of a streamlined registration system targeted for the poor residents in Peru to identify how costly and burdensome registration policies can increase de-regularization. Our analysis indicated that the elimination of such a system led to a significant reduction in the probability of registering transactions, including those that involved a change in ownership. Overall, our findings stress the necessity of building specific components aimed at maintaining properties formal into the design of urban titling programs.

Keywords: titling programs; registration; property transactions; property rights; natural experiment; Peru (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: K0 O18 P14 R20 R28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2016-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cse, nep-dev, nep-iue and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Journal Article: Reverting to Informality: Unregistered Property Transactions and the Erosion of the Titling Reform in Peru (2020)
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