Mean-Field Leader-Follower Games with Terminal State Constraint

Guanxing Fu and Ulrich Horst
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Guanxing Fu: HU Berlin
Ulrich Horst: HU Berlin

No 129, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition

Abstract: We analyze linear McKean-Vlasov forward-backward SDEs arising in leader-follower games with mean-field type control and terminal state constraints on the state process. We establish an existence and uniqueness of solutions result for such systems in time-weighted spaces as well as a convergence result of the solutions with respect to certain perturbations of the drivers of both the forward and the backward component. The general results are used to solve a novel single-player model of portfolio liquidation under market impact with expectations feedback as well as a novel Stackelberg game of optimal portfolio liquidation with asymmetrically informed players.

Keywords: mean-field control; stackelberg game; mean-field game with a major player; portfolio liquidation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-12-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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