Sender-Receiver Games with Cooperation

Francoise Forges and Ulrich Horst

No 17, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition

Abstract: We consider generalized sender-receiver games in which the sender also has a decision to make, but this decision does not directly affect the receiver. We introduce specific perfect Bayesian equilibria, in which the players agree on a joint decision after that a message has been sent (\"talk and cooperate equilibrium\", TCE). We establish that a TCE exists provided that the receiver has a \"uniform punishment decision\" (UPD) against the sender.

Keywords: sender-receiver game; commitment; cooperative solution; individual rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C65 C72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-03-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://rationality-and-competition.de/wp-content/ ... cussion_paper/17.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Sender–receiver games with cooperation (2018)
Working Paper: Sender-receiver games with cooperation (2018)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rco:dpaper:17

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Viviana Lalli ().