A Theory of Crowdfunding

Roland Strausz

No 2, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition

Abstract: Crowdfunding provides innovation in enabling entrepreneurs to contract with consumers before investment. Under aggregate demand uncertainty, this improves screening for valuable projects. Entrepreneurial moral hazard and private cost information threatens this benefit. Crowdfunding\'s after-markets enable consumers to actively implement deferred payments and thereby manage moral hazard. Popular crowdfunding platforms offer schemes that allow consumers to do so through conditional pledging behavior. Efficiency is sustainable only if expected returns exceed an agency cost associated with the entrepreneurial incentive problems. By reducing demand uncertainty, crowdfunding promotes welfare and complements traditional entrepreneurial financing, which focuses on controlling moral hazard.

Keywords: Crowdfunding; entrepreneurship; moral hazard; demand uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 G32 L11 M31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-03-25
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-ent, nep-ino, nep-mic and nep-ppm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (110)

Downloads: (external link)
https://rationality-and-competition.de/wp-content/uploads/discussion_paper/2.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rco:dpaper:2

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Viviana Lalli ().