A Model United Nations Experiment on Climate Negotiations

Elisa Hofmann, Lucas Kyriacou and Klaus M. Schmidt
Additional contact information
Elisa Hofmann: University of Jena
Lucas Kyriacou: University of Bern
Klaus M. Schmidt: LMU Munich

No 266, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition

Abstract: Weitzman (2014) proposed that focusing international climate negotiations on a uniform carbon price is more effective than Paris style negotiations in achieving ambitious climate action. We put this hypothesis to an experimental test by simulating international negotiations on climate change in collaboration with Model United Nations associations. This novel experimental format combines some of the advantages of lab and field experiments. Our results show that negotiating a common commitment on a uniform carbon price yields significantly higher emissions reductions, more participation, and more equal contributions than individual commitments to a non-binding common goal à la Paris.

Keywords: climate negotiations; negotiation design; model United Nations; uniform carbon price (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C81 C93 F51 H87 Q54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-01-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://rationality-and-competition.de/wp-content/uploads/2021/01/266.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rco:dpaper:266

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Viviana Lalli ().