Signaling Motives in Lying Games

Tilman Fries
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Tilman Fries: WZB Berlin

No 269, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition

Abstract: This paper studies the implications of agents signaling their moral type in a lying game. In the theoretical analysis, a signaling motive emerges where agents dislike being suspected of lying and where some types of liars are more stigmatized than others. The equilibrium prediction of the model can explain experimental data from previous studies, in particular on partial lying, where some agents dishonestly report a non payo

Keywords: lying; image concerns; honesty; experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D82 D90 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-01-14
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-evo, nep-exp and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rco:dpaper:269

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