Self-Persuasion: Evidence from Field Experiments at International Debating Competitions

Peter Schwardmann, Egon Tripodi and Joël J. van der Weele
Additional contact information
Peter Schwardmann: Carnegie Mellon University
Joël J. van der Weele: University of Amsterdam and Tinbergen Institute

No 306, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition

Abstract: Laboratory evidence shows that when people have to argue for a given position, they persuade themselves about the position’s factual and moral superiority. Such self-persuasion limits the potential of communication to resolve conflict and reduce polarization. We test for this phenomenon in a field setting, at international debating competitions that randomly assign experienced and motivated debaters to argue one side of a topical motion. We find self-persuasion in factual beliefs and confidence in one’s position. Effect sizes are smaller than in the laboratory, but robust to a one-hour exchange of arguments and a ten-fold increase in incentives for accuracy.

JEL-codes: C93 D72 D83 D91 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2021-12-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Journal Article: Self-Persuasion: Evidence from Field Experiments at International Debating Competitions (2022)
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