Income Contingency and the Electorate's Support for Tuition

Philipp Lergetporer and Ludger Woessmann
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Philipp Lergetporer: TU Munich and ifo Institute

No 311, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition

Abstract: We show that the electorate’s preferences for using tuition to finance higher education strongly depend on the design of the payment scheme. In representative surveys of the German electorate (N>18,000), experimentally replacing regular upfront by deferred income-contingent payments increases public support for tuition by 18 percentage points. The treatment turns a plurality opposed to tuition into a strong majority of 62 percent in favor. Additional experiments reveal that the treatment effect similarly shows when framed as loan repayments, when answers carry political consequences, and in a survey of adolescents. Reduced fairness concerns and improved student situations act as strong mediators.

Keywords: tuition; higher education finance; income-contingent loans; voting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H52 I22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022-01-18
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur, nep-exp and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Income Contingency and the Electorate's Support for Tuition (2024)
Working Paper: Income Contingency and the Electorate’s Support for Tuition (2022)
Working Paper: Income Contingency and the Electorate's Support for Tuition (2022)
Working Paper: Income Contingency and the Electorates Support for Tuition (2022)
Working Paper: Income Contingency and the Electorate's Support for Tuition (2022)
Working Paper: Income Contingency and the Electorate's Support for Tuition (2022)
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