Responsibility-Shifting through Delegation: Evidence from China’s One-Child Policy

Yiming Liu and Yi Han
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Yiming Liu: HU Berlin
Yi Han: Renmin University of China

No 400, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition

Abstract: We provide evidence on how responsibility-shifting through delegation occurred in China’s implementation of the one-child policy. We show that trust in local governments was reduced when they were the primary enforcer of the policy (1979–1990), while trust in neighbors was reduced when civilians were incentivized to report neighbors’ violations of the policy to the authorities (1991–2015). This effect was more pronounced among parents of a firstborn daughter, who were more likely to violate the policy due to the deep-rooted son preference. This study provides the first set of field evidence on the responsibility-shifting effect of delegation.

Keywords: delegation; responsibility-shifting; One-Child policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 D04 D90 J18 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-06-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cna and nep-mfd
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