The Taxation of Couples

Felix Bierbrauer, Pierre Boyer, Andreas Peichl and Daniel Weishaar
Additional contact information
Felix Bierbrauer: University of Cologne
Daniel Weishaar: LMU Munich

No 405, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition

Abstract: Are reforms towards individual taxation politically feasible? Are they desirable from a welfare perspective? We develop a method to answer such questions and apply it to the US federal income tax since the 1960s. Main findings are: As of today, Pareto-improvements require a move away from joint taxation. Revenue-neutral reforms towards individual taxation are not Pareto-improving, but attract majoritysupport. Such reforms are rejected by Rawlsian welfare measures and supported by ones with weights that are increasing in the secondary earner’s income share. Thus, there is a tension between the welfare of “the poor” and the welfare of “working women.”

Keywords: taxation of couples; tax reforms; optimal taxation; political economy; non-linear income taxation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 D82 H21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-06-30
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The Taxation of Couples (2023)
Working Paper: The Taxation of Couples (2023)
Working Paper: The taxation of couples (2023)
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