Whom to Inform about Prices? Evidence from the German Fuel Market

Felix Montag, Alina Sagimuldina and Christoph Winter
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Felix Montag: Tuck School at Dartmouth College
Alina Sagimuldina: LMU Munich
Christoph Winter: EY-Parthenon

No 415, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition

Abstract: Combining a theoretical model of imperfect information with empirical evidence, we show how the effect of providing price information to consumers depends on how well informed they are beforehand. Theoretically, an increase in consumer information decreases prices more, the fewer ex ante informed consumers there are. Empirically, we study mandatory price disclosure in the German fuel market for two fuel types that differ in ex ante consumer information. The decline in prices is stronger when there are fewer ex ante informed consumers. The magnitude of the treatment effect declines over time but is intensified by local follow-on information campaigns.

Keywords: mandatory price disclosure; consumer information; retail fuel market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-08-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ene, nep-ind and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rco:dpaper:415

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