Fairness in Matching Markets: Experimental Evidence

Tobias König, Dorothea Kübler, Lydia Mechtenberg and Renke Schmacker
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Dorothea Kübler: WZB Berlin, TU Berlin
Lydia Mechtenberg: University of Hamburg

No 442, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition

Abstract: We investigate fairness preferences in matching mechanisms using a spectator design. Participants choose between the Boston mechanism or the serial dictatorship mechanism (SD) played by others. In our setup, the Boston mechanism generates justified envy, while the strategy-proof SD ensures envy-freeness. When priorities are merit-based, many spectators prefer the Boston mechanism, and this preference increases when priorities are determined by luck. At the same time, there is support for SD, but mainly when priorities are merit-based. Stated voting motives indicate that choosing SD is driven by concerns for envy-freeness rather than strategy-proofness, while support for the Boston mechanism stems from the belief that strategic choices create entitlements.

Keywords: matching markets; school choice; voting; Boston mechanism; sincere agents; justified envy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D47 D74 I24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023-11-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Working Paper: Fairness in matching markets: Experimental evidence (2023)
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