Matching with Waiting Times: The German Entry-Level Labor Market for Lawyers

Philipp D. Dimakopoulos and C.-Philipp Heller
Additional contact information
Philipp D. Dimakopoulos: Humboldt University Berlin
C.-Philipp Heller: Humboldt University Berlin

No 68, Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition

Abstract: We study the allocation of German lawyers to regional courts for legal trainee-ships. Because of excess demand in some regions lawyers often have to wait before being allocated. The currently used \"Berlin\" mechanism is not weakly Pareto efficient, does not eliminate justified envy and does not respect improvements. We introduce a mechanism based on the matching with contracts literature, using waiting time as the contractual term. The resulting mechanism is strategy-proof, weakly Pareto efficient, eliminates justified envy and respects improvements. We extend our proposed mechanism to allow for a more flexible allocation of positions over time.

Keywords: many-to-one matching; matching with contracts; stability; slot-specific choice functions; waiting time; legal education (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 D82 H75 I28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-01-22
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-des and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://rationality-and-competition.de/wp-content/ ... cussion_paper/68.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rco:dpaper:68

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Rationality and Competition Discussion Paper Series from CRC TRR 190 Rationality and Competition
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Viviana Lalli ().