Social Security Reform with Heterogeneous Agents
Juan Carlos Conesa and
Dirk Krueger
Review of Economic Dynamics, 1999, vol. 2, issue 4, 757-795
Abstract:
This paper analyzes the quantitative role of idiosyncratic uncertainty in an economy in which rational agents vote on hypothetical social security reforms. We find that the role of a pay-as-you-go social security system as a partial insurance and redistribution device significantly reduces political support for a transition to an economy with a fully funded system. We conclude that the status quo bias in favor of an unfunded social security system is stronger in economies in which agents of similar age differ significantly with respect to labor earnings and wealth due to idiosyncratic income uncertainty. (Copyright: Elsevier)
Keywords: social security reform; transition; idiosyncratic uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E62 H3 H55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 1999
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (352)
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DOI: 10.1006/redy.1998.0039
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