Fiscal policy coordination in monetary unions

Josef Schroth

No 74, 2013 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: The paper studies the design of optimal fiscal rules for members of a monetary union when there are privately observed shocks to countries’ social cost of domestic taxation. First, I show that optimal fiscal rules prescribe policy coordination in the sense of domestic taxation efforts that are positively correlated across member countries. In particular, coordination achieves higher ex-ante joint welfare than any fixed upper bound on domestic deficits. Second, I show that a history of asymmetric domestic taxation efforts leads to tighter policy coordination in the sense of an emergence of retaliatory fiscal policies. As a result, past disagreement leads to an increase in expected domestic deficits across the monetary union.

Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-dge, nep-mon and nep-opm
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://red-files-public.s3.amazonaws.com/meetpapers/2013/paper_74.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed013:74

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2013 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann (chuichuiche@gmail.com).