Competing Teams

Hector Chade
Additional contact information
Hector Chade: arizona state university

No 1179, 2014 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: In many economic environments, firms compete in output markets that are not competitive, either because there is strategic interaction such as in a patent race or an oligopoly, or there are externalities such as knowledge spillovers. Very often, having skilled workers is crucial for success in these non-competitive markets. The key question in the presence of market failure is how and when the market allocation of workers to teams differs from the socially optimal allocation. Is it optimal to have the best workers together in superstar teams competing against low skilled teams, or is it better to have competition between balanced teams? Under what circumstances is the market allocation efficient? This has far-reaching implications for the optimal design of markets, ranging from research to sports competitions.

Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com and nep-cta
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://red-files-public.s3.amazonaws.com/meetpapers/2014/paper_1179.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed014:1179

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2014 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().