EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

Meeting Technologies and Optimal Trading Mechanisms in Competitive Search Marks

Ronald Wolthoff, Ludo Visschers and Benjamin Lester

No 188, 2014 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: In many markets, sellers advertise their good with an asking price. This is a price at which the seller will take his good off the market and trade immediately, though it is understood that a buyer can submit an offer below the asking price and that this offer may be accepted if the seller receives no better offers. Despite their prevalence in a variety of real world markets, asking prices have received little attention in the academic literature. We construct an environment with a few simple, realistic ingredients and demonstrate that using an asking price is optimal: it is the pricing mechanism that maximizes sellers' revenues and it implements the efficient outcome in equilibrium. We provide a complete characterization of this equilibrium and use it to explore the positive implications of this pricing mechanism for transaction prices and allocations.

Date: 2014
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

There are no downloads for this item, see the EconPapers FAQ for hints about obtaining it.

Related works:
Journal Article: Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets (2015) Downloads
Working Paper: Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Meeting Technologies and Optimal Trading Mechanisms in Competitive Search Markets (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Meeting technologies and optimal trading mechanisms in competitive search markets (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Meeting Technologies and Optimal Trading Mechanisms in Competitive Search Markets (2014) Downloads
Working Paper: Meeting Technologies and Optimal Trading Mechanisms in Competitive Search Markets (2014) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed014:188

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2014 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().

 
Page updated 2025-05-16
Handle: RePEc:red:sed014:188