Optimal Mirrleesian Taxation in Non-competitive Labor Markets

Carlos Eugênio da Costa ()

No 1207, 2017 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: We study optimal labor income taxation in non-competitive labor markets. Firms with market power offer screening contracts to workers privately informed about their own productivity. We provide necessary and sufficient conditions for tax implementation of constrained efficient allocations in such environment. For a Utilitarian objective, if an allocation is implementable almost all workers face negative marginal tax rates, however, not all allocations that are implementable in a competitive setting are implementable in this non-competitive environment.

Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pbe
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Related works:
Journal Article: Optimal Mirrleesian taxation in non-competitive labor markets (2019)
Working Paper: Optimal Mirrleesian taxation in non-competitive labor markets (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed017:1207

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