Targeted Search in Matching Markets

Paulina Restrepo-Echavarria, Antonella Tutino and Anton Cheremukhin
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Antonella Tutino: Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas

No 1413, 2017 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: We endogenize the degree of randomness in the matching process by proposing a model where agents have to pay a search cost to locate potential matches more accurately. The model features a tension between an agent's desire to nd a more productive match and to maximize the odds of nding a match. This tension drives a wedge between the shape of sorting patterns and the shape of the underlying match payo function. We show the empirical relevance of the latter prediction by applying the model to the U.S. marriage market.

Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Related works:
Journal Article: Targeted search in matching markets (2020)
Working Paper: Targeted Search in Matching Markets (2019)
Working Paper: Targeted search in matching markets (2016)
Working Paper: Targeted Search in Matching Markets (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed017:1413

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