Corporate Governance, Managerial Compensation, and Disruptive Innovations

Murat Celik and Xu Tian
Additional contact information
Xu Tian: University of Toronto

No 590, 2018 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics

Abstract: Whether a CEO manages the innovation efforts of the firm in line with shareholder preferences has a substantial impact on market value and firm growth, which in turn influence aggregate productivity growth and welfare. Using data on U.S. public firms, we find that (i) firms with better corporate governance tend to adopt highly incentivized contracts rich in stock options; and (ii) such contracts are more likely to lead to disruptive innovations -- patented inventions that are in the upper tail of the distribution in terms of quality and originality. We develop and estimate a new dynamic general equilibrium model of firm-level innovation with agency frictions and endogenous determination of executive contracts. The model is used to study the joint dynamics of corporate governance, managerial compensation, and disruptive innovations. Better corporate governance can reduce the influence of the CEO in the determination of the compensation structure. This leads to more incentivized contracts and boosts innovation, with substantial benefits for the shareholders, as well as the broader economy through knowledge spillovers. Shutting down the agency frictions leads to an increase in long-run output growth, which translates into a significant welfare gain in consumption equivalent terms.

Date: 2018
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cse, nep-cta, nep-dge and nep-ino
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
https://red-files-public.s3.amazonaws.com/meetpapers/2018/paper_590.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:red:sed018:590

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in 2018 Meeting Papers from Society for Economic Dynamics Society for Economic Dynamics Marina Azzimonti Department of Economics Stonybrook University 10 Nicolls Road Stonybrook NY 11790 USA. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Christian Zimmermann ().