An Experimental Study of Auctions Versus Grandfathering to Assign Pollution Permits

Jacob Goeree, Charles Holt, Karen Palmer, William Shobe and Dallas Burtraw

RFF Working Paper Series from Resources for the Future

Abstract: We experimentally study auctions versus grandfathering in the initial assignment of pollution permits that can be traded in a secondary spot market. Low and high emitters compete for permits in the auction, while permits are assigned for free under grandfathering. In theory, trading in the spot market should erase inefficiencies due to initial mis-allocations. In the experiment, high emitters exercise market power in the spot market and permit holdings under grandfathering remain skewed towards high emitters. Furthermore, the opportunity costs of “free” permits are fully “passed through.” In the auction, the majority of permits are won by low emitters, reducing the need for spot-market trading. Auctions generate higher consumer surplus and slightly lower product prices in the laboratory arkets. Moreover, auctions eliminate the large “windfall profits” that are observed in the treatment with free, grandfathered permit allocations.

Keywords: market-based regulation; emissions trading; allocation; auctions; grandfathering; climate policy; windfall profits (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C92 D43 D44 Q58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-09-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ene, nep-env, nep-exp and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Related works:
Journal Article: An Experimental Study of Auctions Versus Grandfathering to Assign Pollution Permits (2010)
Working Paper: An experimental study of auctions versus grandfathering to assign pollution permits (2009)
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