The Impact of Team Inspections on Enforcement and Deterrence

Lucija Muehlenbachs, Stefan Staubli and Mark Cohen

RFF Working Paper Series from Resources for the Future

Abstract: This paper provides new insights into the productivity of teams. Government enforcement agencies often send teams of inspectors instead of a sole inspector to a regulated facility. Yet, determining the impact of teams is problematic due to endogeneity (e.g., the enforcement agency might naturally send larger teams when they expect a more violations). Exploiting exogenous variation in the number of inspectors that are sent to offshore oil and gas platforms in the Gulf of Mexico, we show that adding an inspector to a team increases the number of sanctions issued as well as the severity of the sanctions.Classification-JEL: Q58, K42

Keywords: inspections; enforcement; deterrence; offshore oil (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-11-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ger and nep-law
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Journal Article: The Impact of Team Inspections on Enforcement and Deterrence (2016)
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