A trade-off from the future: How risk aversion may explain the demand for illiquid assets
Eduardo Ferraz Castelo Branco Ferreira and
César Mantilla
Working papers from Red Investigadores de Economía
Abstract:
We use a three-period model adopting a recursive definition of consumption to explore the optimal delegation that a present self, aware that her near-future self is present-biased but better informed, will make to protect her far-future self against income shocks. The model captures the present self's trade-off between using commitment mechanisms, restricting the near-future self's agency through illiquid savings, and profiting from the near-future self's better information about future shocks. Our main result states that agents with higher risk aversion can cover better against utility losses from time-inconsistent consumption through the commitment mechanism. Given the evidence of women being more risk-averse than men, this result provides the micro-foundation for the gender gap in adopting financial commitment devices, especially among single individuals.
Keywords: commitment devices; dynamic inconsistency; Epstein-Zin preferences; present bias (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D11 D81 D90 G40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 27
Date: 2022-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-fdg, nep-rmg and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://repositorio.redinvestigadores.org/bitstrea ... quence=1&isAllowed=y (application/pdf)
Related works:
Working Paper: A trade-off from the future: How risk aversion may explain the demand for illiquid assets (2022) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rie:riecdt:97
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Working papers from Red Investigadores de Economía Cra 7 # 14-78. Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by CAIE ().