Do Benevolent Aspects Have Room Explaining EU Bydget Receipts?

Heikki Kauppi and Mika Widgrén

No 1161, Discussion Papers from The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy

Abstract: The member states have self-interested objectives and they use their voting power in the Council of Ministers (CM) to maximize their shares from the EU budget, whereas European Parliament (EP) uses its power to support benevolent objectives and equality between member states. Given the current decision procedures of the EU, EP has effective power on non-compulsory expenditure covering structural spending, but not on compulsory expenditure consisting mainly of agricultural spending. We use this fact to assess how the assumed benevolent objectives of EP turn into member statesŽ budget receipts in a power politics based model.

Keywords: European integration; EU budget; voting power (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D70 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 26 pages
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-eec
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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