Performance Measurement and Incentive Plans

Antti Kauhanen () and Sami Napari

No 1216, Discussion Papers from The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy

Abstract: This paper explores performance measurement in incentive plans. Based on theory, we argue that differences in the nature of jobs between blue- and white-collar employees lead to differences in incentive systems. We find that performance measurement for white-collar workers is broader in terms of the performance measures, the organizational level of performance measurement and the time horizon. The intensity of incentives is also stronger for white-collar employees. All of these findings are consistent with theory.

Keywords: incentive pay; performance measurement; risk versus distortion trade-off; agency theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J33 M52 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2010
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-cta, nep-eff and nep-lab
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Journal Article: Performance Measurement and Incentive Plans (2012)
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