Tribal Art Market. Signs and Signals

Guido Candela (), Massimiliano Castellani () and Pierpaolo Pattitoni
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Guido Candela: Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Italy; The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis (RCEA), Italy
Massimiliano Castellani: Department of Economics, University of Bologna, Italy; The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis (RCEA), Italy

Working Paper series from Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis

Abstract: In this paper, we present a model for the marketability of a Tribal artwork and we test this model empirically using a unique hand-collected dataset, which comprises the worldwide Tribal art market auctions between 1999 and 2008. Our results show a significant relationship between the probability of an artwork to be sold and several signs and signals. The effect of the auction estimated prices on the probability of sales is nonlinear, and allows us to divide the Tribal art market into two price regimes. In the low-price regime, the effect of the auction estimated price on the probability of sales is negative. In the high-price regime, the effect of the auction estimated price on the probability of sales is positive.

Keywords: Tribal art; Signs; Signals; Veblen effect; Conspicuous consumption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C25 Z11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-01, Revised 2012-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-cul
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Tribal art market: signs and signals (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rim:rimwps:02_11

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