Understanding the artwork pricing: some theoretical models

Francesco Angelini and Massimiliano Castellani ()
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Massimiliano Castellani: Department of Statistics, University of Bologna, Italy; The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis

Working Paper series from Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis

Abstract: This paper analyses the pricing of new artworks sold for the first time in the private art market, investigating price-formation mechanisms at work. Using a bargaining game approach, we find that the bargaining power of each agent is key in identifying the market channel preferred by the artist and, then, her incentive in creating a new artwork.

Keywords: bargaining; pricing; cultural economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 L11 Z11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-10, Revised 2018-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cul and nep-gth
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http://www.rcea.org/RePEc/pdf/wp17-25.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Private pricing in the art market (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rim:rimwps:17-25

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