On the evolution of individual preferences and family rules

Alessandro Cigno and Annalisa Luporini ()

Working Paper series from Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis

Abstract: Assuming that the members of each sex are differentiated by an inherited trait, and that couples are formed at random because this trait is private information until marriage, we show that the distribution of the trait evolves from generation to generation as a result of mixed marriages. This will ultimately lead to everyone having the same trait. For the case where the trait is a parameter measuring a person's taste for receiving filial attention in old age, we also show that, if the pair of parameter values characterizing a couple satisfy a certain condition, it is in the couple's common interest to obey a rule requiring them to give specified amounts of attention to their respective parents. As the distribution of this parameter changes because of mixed marriages, the share of the population who obey the rule in question changes too. In the long run, everybody has the same preferences, and either everybody obeys the same rule, or nobody obeys any. The consequences of immigration and the implications for welfare policy are discussed.

Keywords: Marriage; evolution; family rules; immigration; welfare policy (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-dge, nep-eec, nep-mac and nep-mon
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

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http://rcea.org/RePEc/pdf/wp18-07.pdf

Related works:
Working Paper: On the evolution of individual preferences and family rules (2019)
Working Paper: On the evolution of individual preferences and family rules (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rim:rimwps:18-07

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