Exploration for Nonrenewable Resources in a Dynamic Oligopoly: An Arrovian Result

Luca Lambertini ()

Working Paper series from Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis

Abstract: The model proposed in this paper investigates a differential Cournot oligopoly game with nonrenewable resource exploitation, in which each firm may exploit either its own private pool or a common pool jointly with the rivals. Firms use a deterministic technology to invest in exploration activities. There emerges that (i) the individual exploration effort is higher when each firms has exclusive rights on a pool of its own, and (ii) depending on whether each firm has access to its own pool or all firms exploit a common one, the aggregate exploration effort is either increasing or constant in the number of firms.

Keywords: differential games; natural resources; oligopoly (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 L13 Q30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com and nep-gth
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http://www.rcea.org/RePEc/pdf/wp25_13.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Exploration for Nonrenewable Resources in a Dynamic Oligopoly: An Arrovian Result (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rim:rimwps:25_13

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