Organizational Structure and the Choice of Price vs. Quantity in a Mixed Duopoly

Alessandra Chirco (), Caterina Colombo () and Marcella Scrimitore

Working Paper series from Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis

Abstract: We consider the choice of price/quantity by a public and a private firm in a mixed differentiated duopoly. First, we study the way in which the strategic choice of the market variable is affected by different given organizational structures (managerial or entrepreneurial) of the public and the private firm. Second, we investigate how the price/quantity choice interacts with the endogenous choice of the organizational structure, thus determining a subgame perfect equilibrium at which firms choose to behave as price-setters and to adopt a managerial structure.

Keywords: mixed duopoly; strategic delegation; price competition; quantity competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L22 L32 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com and nep-mic
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rim:rimwps:27_13

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