Feedback Equilibria in a Dynamic Renewable Resource Oligopoly: Pre-Emption, Voracity and Exhaustion

Luca Lambertini () and Andrea Mantovani

Working Paper series from Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis

Abstract: We revisit Benchekroun (2008) to describe a differential oligopoly game of resource extraction under static, linear feedback and nonlinear feedback strategies, to show that (i) feedback rules entail resource exhaustion for a finite number of firms; and (ii) feedback strategies are more aggressive than static ones as long as the resource stock is large enough, in accordance with the acquired view based on the traditional pre-emption argument associated with feedback information.

Keywords: dynamic oligopoly; renewable resources; feedback strategies (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 L13 Q2 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-com
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Feedback equilibria in a dynamic renewable resource oligopoly: Pre-emption, voracity and exhaustion (2014)
Working Paper: Feedback equilibria in a dynamic renewable resource oligopoly: pre-emption, voracity and exhaustion (2013)
Working Paper: Feedback equilibria in a dynamic renewable resource oligopoly: pre-emption, voracity and exhaustion (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rim:rimwps:56_13

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