Transitions in Central Bank Leadership

Carlos Carvalho, Tiago Fl´orido and Eduardo Zilberman
Additional contact information
Tiago Fl´orido: Harvard University

No 657, Textos para discussão from Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil)

Abstract: We assemble a novel dataset on transitions in central bank leadership in several countries, and study how monetary policy is conducted around those events. We find that policy is tighter both at the last meetings of departing governors and first meetings of incoming leaders. This finding cannot be fully explained by endogenous transitions, the effects of the zero lower bound, surges in inflation expectations, omitted variables such as fiscal policy and uncertainty nor electoral cycles. We conclude by offering two possible, perhaps complementary, explanations for these results. One based on a simple signalling story, another based on career and reputation concerns.Creation-Date: 2017-07

Pages: 74p
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-mac and nep-mon
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.econ.puc-rio.br/uploads/adm/trabalhos/files/td657.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:rio:texdis:657

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Textos para discussão from Department of Economics PUC-Rio (Brazil) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by (flavia@econ.puc-rio.br).