Shotgun Mechanisms for Common-Value Partnerships: The Unassigned-Offeror Problem

Claudia Landeo and Kathryn Spier ()
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Kathryn Spier: Harvard Law School, Postal: 1575 Massachusetts Avenue, Cambridge MA 02138

No 2013-10, Working Papers from University of Alberta, Department of Economics

Abstract: Shotguns clauses are commonly included in the business agreements of partnerships and limited liability companies (LLCs), but the role of o fferor typically remains unassigned. In a common-value, one-sided asymmetric information setting, unfair and ineffcient outcomes occur with an unassigned o fferor. Experimental results are aligned with our theory.

Keywords: Business Deadlock; Shotgun Mechanisms; Asymmetric Information; Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C90 D82 K40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2013-07-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Journal Article: Shotgun mechanisms for common-value partnerships: The unassigned-offeror problem (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:albaec:2013_010

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