Screening for Collusion in Wholesale Electricity Markets: A Review of the Literature

David Brown, Andrew Eckert () and Douglas Silveira
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Andrew Eckert: University of Alberta, Department of Economics, Postal: 8-14 HM Tory Building, Edmonton, AB, T6G 2H4

No 2023-7, Working Papers from University of Alberta, Department of Economics

Abstract: Wholesale electricity markets have several features that increase the likelihood of collusion, including frequent interaction, multimarket contact, and a high degree of information transparency. As a result, screening techniques for detecting collusive agreements are desired. In this paper, we survey the existing literature on collusive screens and collusion in electricity markets. We discuss key features of non-competitive behaviour to be reflected in screens and suggest directions for improved screening in this industry. In particular, there is considerable potential to include machine learning and data mining techniques in screens in the electricity sector due to recent improvements in these methods.

Keywords: Screening Methods; Collusion; Electricity Markets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L40 L94 Q40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 49 pages
Date: 2023-06-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ene, nep-ind, nep-mfd, nep-reg and nep-res
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:albaec:2023_007

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