 기업결합과 혁신: 미국 디지털플랫폼과 경쟁정책을 중심으로(Merger and Innovation: Focusing on the U.S. Digital Platforms and Competition Policy)Gusang Kang (),
Hyok Jung Kim (),
Jonghyuk Kim (),
Hyuk Ju Kwon () and
Won Sung
No 23-5, Policy Analyses from Korea Institute for International Economic Policy Abstract: 본 연구에서는 지난 20년간 미국 대형 디지털플랫폼이 수많은 중소기업을 대상으로 수행한 기업결합 행위가 해당 디지털플랫폼의 성과에 미친 영향을 혁신 및 수익성 관점에서 분석하였다. 또한 이 연구는 그와 같은 기업결합 거래 중 대형 디지털플랫폼이 자사의 잠재 경쟁자로 성장할 수 있는 혁신기업을 인수함으로써 미래 시장 경쟁을 완화하려는 목적으로 수행하는 ‘킬러 인수’를 식별하고, 해당 기업결합 행위가 디지털플랫폼의 혁신에 미친 영향을 살펴보았다. 이를 통해 본 연구는 디지털플랫폼을 대상으로 한 한국 공정거래위원회의 기업결합 심사에 대한 관련된 정책 시사점을 도출하였다. This study analyzes the impact of the large U.S. digital platforms such as GAFAM (Google, Apple, Facebook, Amazon, Microsoft) on their performance in terms of innovation and sales, focusing on their mergers and acquisitions (M&A) activities targeting numerous small and medium-sized enterprises over the past 20 years. It also identifies ‘killer acquisitions’, where these platforms acquire innovative companies that could become potential competitors, thereby potentially reducing future market competition. The study provides insights and policy implications for the Korean Fair Trade Commission’s merger review process for digital platforms. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the relationship between M&A and innovation and discusses the motives for M&A in the digital platform market, including ‘killer acquisitions’. Traditional M&A motives such as economies of scale and scope, acquisition of unique technologies or new distribution channels, and increased market dominance are contrasted with those in the digital platform industry, which include securing core assets like technology, processes, and intellectual property. Recent literature has raised concerns about ‘killer acquisitions’ that may reduce or eliminate future competition, although the definition of ‘particularly competitive future competitors’ and the limited pre-emptive merger policy pose challenges. Chapter 3 examines the types, characteristics, and status of M&As conducted by GAFAM, categorizing them into vertical, horizontal, and conglomerate mergers. Despite the unique characteristics of the digital platform industry, most M&As have been approved by the U.S. competition authorities. However, this has led to criticism of high market concentration. Recent arguments suggest the need to actively incorporate data characteristics in assessing the competitive restraints of M&A.(the rest omitted) Keywords: Competition policy; intellectual property rights; business combination; innovation; digital platform; Killer Acquisition; competition policy (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:kieppa:2023_005 Access Statistics for this paper More papers in Policy Analyses from Korea Institute for International Economic Policy [30147] 3rd Floor Building C Sejong National Research Complex 370 Sicheong-daero Sejong-si, Korea. Contact information at EDIRC. |
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