The Reform of the WTO's Appellate Body: An Economic Perspective

Sangjun Yea ()
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Sangjun Yea: KOREA INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC POLICY (KIEP), Postal: [30147] Building C Sejong National Research Complex 370 Sicheong-daero Sejong-si Korea, https://www.kiep.go.kr/eng/

No 21-27, World Economy Brief from Korea Institute for International Economic Policy

Abstract: Throughout this study, I consider some possible changes that may occur when the WTO's AB is reformed based on the opinions stated by the US. Especially focusing on the issues of activist AB and its reviewing member countries' domestic law, I conclude that banning the AB's activist role may result in more opportunistic and inefficient policy choices on the part of member countries as to importing industries with less disputes cases. Regarding the latter issue, I argue that limiting the AB's standard of review does not much change strategic decisions of member countries.

Keywords: WTO; Appellate Body; US (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 8 pages
Date: 2021-05-20
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cwa and nep-int
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ris:kiepwe:2021_027

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